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Nachweise

09.12.2019 Druckversion  |  Schrift: vergrößern verkleinern 

Nachweise zu Jean Moritz Müller, Motivierende Gründe, Heft 4/2019

Nachweise zu

Motivierende Gründe: Aktuelle Probleme und Kontroversen
Ein Bericht von Jean Moritz Müller

Heft 4/2019

 

[1] Alvarez, M. (2010). Kinds of Reason: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. Oxford:   Oxford University Press.

[2] Alvarez, M. (2017). „Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation”. In E. Zalta (Hg.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Ausgabe Winter 2017). URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/>.

[3] Alvarez, M. (2018). „Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality“. Synthese 195, 3293-3310.

[4] Bittner, R. (2001). Doing Things for Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[5] Dancy, J. (2000). Practical Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[6] Dancy, J. (2008). „How to Act – Disjunctively“. In F. MacPherson & A. Haddock (Hg.). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 262-279.

[7] Davidson, D. (1990). „Handlungen, Gründe und Ursachen”. In ders., Handlung und Ereignis. Übersetzt von J. Schulte. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 19-42. (Urspr. veröffentlicht als „Actions, Reasons and Causes“ in: Journal of Philosophy 60(23), 1963, 685-700.)

[8] Davidson, D. (1996). „Eine Kohärenztheorie der Wahrheit und Erkenntnis”. In T. Grundmann & K. Stüber (Hg.). Philosophie der Skepsis. Paderborn: Schöningh, 251-280. (Urspr. veröffentlicht als “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge“ in: E. Lepore (Hg.). Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. New York: Blackwell, 307-319.)

[9] Dietz, C. (2018). „Reasons and Factive Emotions”. Philosophical Studies 175(7), 1681–1691.

[10] Glüer, K. & Wikforss, A. (2018). „Reasons for Belief and Normativity”. In D. Star (Hg.). Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 575-599.

[11] Heuer, U. (2004). „Reasons for Actions and Desires“. Philosophical Studies 121(1), 43–63.

[12] Hieronymi, P. (2011). „Reasons for Action“. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111, 407-427.

[13] Horsnby, J. (2008). „A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons”. In Haddock, A. & MacPherson, F. (eds.). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 244–261.

[14] Hughes, N. (2014). „Is Knowledge the Ability to ffor the Reason that p?” Episteme 11(4), 457-462.

[15] Hyman, J. (1999). „How Knowledge Works”. Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197), 433-451.

[16] Kenny, A. (1963). Action, Emotion and Will. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

[17] Kiesewetter, B. (2018). „Normative und motivierende Gründe: Ein Kommentar zu Susanne Mantels Determined by Reasons“. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 72(3), 421-428.

[18] Lenman, J. (2009). „Reasons for Action: Justification vs. Explanation”. In E. Zalta (Hg.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Ausgabe Sommer 2009). URL = <https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/sum2009/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/>.

[19] Locke, D. (2015). „Knowledge, Explanation, and Motivating Reasons”. American Philosophical Quarterly 52(3), 215–232.

[20] Lord, E. & Sylvan, K. (im Erscheinen). „Prime Time (for the Basing Relation).” In P. Bondy & J. A. Carter (Hg.). Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Basing Relation. London/New York: Routledge.

[21] Mantel, S. (2014). „No Reason for Identity: On the Relation between Motivating and Normative Reasons”. Philosophical Explorations 17, 49-62.

[22] Mantel, S. (2018). Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason. London/New York: Routledge.

[23] Mele, A. (1992). Springs of Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[24] McDowell, J. (1982). „Reason and Action”. Philosophical Investigations 5(4), 301-305

[25] McDowell, J. (2013). „Acting in the Light of a Fact“. In D. Bakhurst, B. Hooker & M.O. Little (Hg.). Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 13-28.

[26] Millar, A. (2004). Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[27] Millar, A. (2014). „Reasons for Belief, Perception and Reflective Knowledge”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1), 1-19.

[28] Müller, J. M. (2017). „How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes”. Dialectica 71(2), 281-308.

[29] Müller, J. M. (2018) „Emotion as Position-Taking”. Philosophia 46(3), 525-540.

[30] Müller, J. M. (im Erscheinen). „Dietrich von Hildebrand“. In T. Szanto & H. Landweer (Hg.). Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion. London/New York: Routledge.

[31] Mulligan, K. (2007). „Intentionality, Knowledge and Formal Objects“. Disputatio 23(2), 205-228.

[32] Mulligan, K. (2010). „Emotions and Values”. In P. Goldie (Hg.). Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 475-500.

[33] Pryor, J. (2007). „Reasons and That-Clauses“. Philosophical Issues 17(1), 217-244.

[34] Scanlon, T. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

[35] Schroeder, M. (2007). Slaves of the Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[36] Schroeder, S. (2001). „Are Reasons Causes? A Wittgensteinian Response to Davidson”. In ders. (Hg.). Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 150-170.

[37] Schlosser, M. (2012). “Taking Something as a Reason for Action”. Philosophical Papers 41(2), 267-304.

[38] Smith, M. (1994). The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell.

[39] Swain, M. (1981). Reasons and Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

[40] Sylvan, K. (2016). „Epistemic Reasons II: Basing”. Philosophy Compass 11(7), 377-389.

[41] Turri, J. (2009). „The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons“. Noûs 43(3), 490-512.

[42] Turri, J. (2011). „Believing for a Reason”. Erkenntnis 74(3), 490-512.

[43] Turri, J. (2012). „Reasons, Answers and Goals”. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9(4), 491-499.

[44] Unger, P. (1975). Ignorance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[45] von Hildebrand, D. (1916). „Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung“. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Vol. 3, 126-251.

[46] von Hildebrand, D. (1953). Christian Ethics. New York: McKay.

[47] Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations). Ins Englische übersetzt von G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

[48] Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical Investigations”. New York: Harper & Row.

 

Unser Autor

Jean Moritz Müller ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der Universität Bonn. Er beschäftigt sich aktuell mit der Frage, ob mentale Einstellungen wesentlich Beweggründe haben. Zu diesem Thema sind zuletzt erschienen bzw. im Erscheinen:

 

-          Müller, J. M. (2017). „How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes”. Dialectica 71(2), 281-308.

-          Müller, J. M. (2018) „Emotion as Position-Taking”. Philosophia 46(3), 525-540.

-          Müller, J. M. (im Erscheinen). „Dietrich von Hildebrand“. In T. Szanto & H. Landweer (Hg.). Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion. London/New York: Routledge.

 







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