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09.12.2019 Druckversion  |  Schrift: vergrößern verkleinern 

Nachweise zu Jean Moritz Müller, Motivierende Gründe, Heft 4/2019

Nachweise zu

Motivierende Gründe: Aktuelle Probleme und Kontroversen
Ein Bericht von Jean Moritz Müller

Heft 4/2019

 

Im Text genannte Literatur:

[1] Alvarez, M. (2010). Kinds of Reason: An Essay in the Philosophy of Action. Oxford:   Oxford University Press.

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[3] Alvarez, M. (2018). „Reasons for Action, Acting for Reasons, and Rationality“. Synthese 195, 3293-3310.

[4] Bittner, R. (2001). Doing Things for Reasons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[5] Dancy, J. (2000). Practical Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[6] Dancy, J. (2008). „How to Act – Disjunctively“. In F. MacPherson & A. Haddock (Hg.). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 262-279.

[7] Dancy, J. (2011). „Acting in Ignorance”. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6(3), 345-357.

[8] Dancy, J. (2014). „On Knowing One’s Reason”. In C. Littlejohn & J. Turri (Hg.). Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief and Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[9] Davidson, D. (1990). „Handlungen, Gründe und Ursachen”. In ders., Handlung und Ereignis. Übersetzt von J. Schulte. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 19-42. (Urspr. veröffentlicht als „Actions, Reasons and Causes“ in: Journal of Philosophy 60(23), 1963, 685-700.)

[10] Davidson, D. (1996). „Eine Kohärenztheorie der Wahrheit und Erkenntnis”. In T. Grundmann & K. Stüber (Hg.). Philosophie der Skepsis. Paderborn: Schöningh, 251-280. (Urspr. veröffentlicht als “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge“ in: E. Lepore (Hg.). Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. New York: Blackwell, 307-319.)

[11] Dietz, C. (2018). „Reasons and Factive Emotions”. Philosophical Studies 175(7), 1681–1691.

[12] Glüer, K. & Wikforss, A. (2018). „Reasons for Belief and Normativity”. In D. Star (Hg.). Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 575-599.

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[14] Hieronymi, P. (2011). „Reasons for Action“. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111, 407-427.

[15] Hornsby, J. (2008). „A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons”. In Haddock, A. & MacPherson, F. (eds.). Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 244–261.

[16] Hughes, N. (2014). „Is Knowledge the Ability to ffor the Reason that p?” Episteme 11(4), 457-462.

[17] Hyman, J. (1999). „How Knowledge Works”. Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197), 433-451.

[18] Hyman, J. (2011). „Acting for Reasons: Reply to Dancy”. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6(3), 358–368.

[19] Kenny, A. (1963). Action, Emotion and Will. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

[20] Kiesewetter, B. (2018). „Normative und motivierende Gründe: Ein Kommentar zu Susanne Mantels Determined by Reasons“. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 72(3), 421-428.

[21] Lenman, J. (2009). „Reasons for Action: Justification vs. Explanation”. In E. Zalta (Hg.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Ausgabe Sommer 2009). URL = <https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/sum2009/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/>.

[22] Locke, D. (2015). „Knowledge, Explanation, and Motivating Reasons”. American Philosophical Quarterly 52(3), 215–232.

[23] Lord, E. (2018). The Importance of Being Rational. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[24] Lord, E. & Sylvan, K. (im Erscheinen). „Prime Time (for the Basing Relation).” In P. Bondy & J. A. Carter (Hg.). Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Basing Relation. London/New York: Routledge.

[25] Mantel, S. (2014). „No Reason for Identity: On the Relation between Motivating and Normative Reasons”. Philosophical Explorations 17, 49-62.

[26] Mantel, S. (2018). Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason. London/New York: Routledge.

[27] Mele, A. (1992). Springs of Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[28] McDowell, J. (1982). „Reason and Action”. Philosophical Investigations 5(4), 301-305

[29] McDowell, J. (2013). „Acting in the Light of a Fact“. In D. Bakhurst, B. Hooker & M.O. Little (Hg.). Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 13-28.

[30] Millar, A. (2004). Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[31] Millar, A. (2014). „Reasons for Belief, Perception and Reflective Knowledge”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1), 1-19.

[32] Müller, J. M. (2017). „How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes”. Dialectica 71(2), 281-308.

[33] Müller, J. M. (2018) „Emotion as Position-Taking”. Philosophia 46(3), 525-540.

[34] Müller, J. M. (im Erscheinen). „Dietrich von Hildebrand“. In T. Szanto & H. Landweer (Hg.). Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion. London/New York: Routledge.

[35] Mulligan, K. (2007). „Intentionality, Knowledge and Formal Objects“. Disputatio 23(2), 205-228.

[36] Mulligan, K. (2010). „Emotions and Values”. In P. Goldie (Hg.). Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 475-500.

[37] Pryor, J. (2007). „Reasons and That-Clauses“. Philosophical Issues 17(1), 217-244.

[38] Scanlon, T. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

[39] Schroeder, M. (2007). Slaves of the Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[40] Schroeder, S. (2001). „Are Reasons Causes? A Wittgensteinian Response to Davidson”. In ders. (Hg.). Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 150-170.

[41] Schlosser, M. (2012). “Taking Something as a Reason for Action”. Philosophical Papers 41(2), 267-304.

[42] Smith, M. (1994). The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell.

[43] Swain, M. (1981). Reasons and Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

[44] Sylvan, K. (2016). „Epistemic Reasons II: Basing”. Philosophy Compass 11(7), 377-389.

[45] Turri, J. (2009). „The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons“. Noûs 43(3), 490-512.

[46] Turri, J. (2011). „Believing for a Reason”. Erkenntnis 74(3), 490-512.

[47] Turri, J. (2012). „Reasons, Answers and Goals”. Journal of Moral Philosophy 9(4), 491-499.

[48] Unger, P. (1975). Ignorance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[49] von Hildebrand, D. (1916). „Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung“. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Vol. 3, 126-251.

[50] von Hildebrand, D. (1953). Christian Ethics. New York: McKay.

[51] Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations). Ins Englische übersetzt von G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

[52] Wittgenstein, L. (1958). The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical Investigations”. New York: Harper & Row.

 

 







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